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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
  
PHILIP E. CANNATA, 
                           
        Plaintiff-Appellant, 
   
v. 
  
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF AUSTIN AND  
ST. JOHN NEUMANN CATHOLIC CHURCH, 
  
 




ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AUSTIN DIVISION 
NO. 1:10-CV-00375-LY 
THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL, PRESIDING 
 
 
AMICUS BRIEF OF PROFESSOR LESLIE GRIFFIN 
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
  
    
     Leslie C. Griffin 
        Pro hac vice 
Professor 
University of Houston 
     100 Law Center 
        Houston, TX 77204 
        Tel: (713) 743-1543 
Fax: (713) 743-2117 
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
 
Amicus Curiae Professor Leslie C. Griffin is a professor of 
constitutional law at the University of Houston Law Center who specializes in 
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. Amicus was invited by this Court to 
address whether the test for determining the applicability of the ministerial 
exception in employment discrimination suits as set out by this Court in 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) remains valid in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  
No party’s counsel authored in whole or in part this brief. No party or 
party’s counsel contributed to funding the preparation or the submission of this 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Does the test for determining the applicability of the ministerial 
exception in employment discrimination suits as set out by this Court in 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) remain valid in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)? 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court rejected the type of bright-line 
test embodied in Starkman in favor of a fact-intensive inquiry that looks at 
many aspects of how the religious institution regarded the plaintiff and how the 
plaintiff conducted herself. As a result, the district court’s decision would 
probably need to be reevaluated under the Hosanna-Tabor standard.  
 
ARGUMENT 
I. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court emphasized “the 
formal title given …by the Church, the substance reflected in that 
title, [the employee’s] own use of that title, and the important 
religious functions she performed for the Church” as key factors 
in determining if an employee is a minister. 
 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court for the first time 
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recognized a ministerial exception, grounded in the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment, that requires the dismissal of some employment 
discrimination lawsuits by ministers against their religious employers. 
Before Hosanna-Tabor was decided, and beginning with this Court’s 
decision in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), every 
circuit court had recognized the ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 
S. Ct. at 705, n. 2; id. at 714. The circuit courts repeatedly disagreed, 
however, about what legal test identified who would be considered a 
minister.  
In Hosanna-Tabor, Justice Alito’s concurrence confirmed this Court’s 
holding in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 
277 (5th Cir. 1981) that “formal ordination [is] not necessary for the 
‘ministerial’ exception to apply.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714 (Alito, 
J., concurring). The Opinion of the Court, however, did not adopt a bright-
line test identifying who qualifies as a minister for ministerial exception 
purposes, instead announcing its reluctance “to adopt a rigid formula for 
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.” Id. at 707.  
Instead, the Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was heavily fact-
dependent. The case involved a “commissioned” teacher at a Lutheran 
elementary school, Cheryl Perich, who was fired when she tried to return to 
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work after a medical leave of absence for narcolepsy. Perich alleged 
retaliation under the Americans With Disabilities Act.  
Focusing on the employee’s function instead of her ordination, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had allowed Perich’s lawsuit to proceed on 
the grounds that her primary duties were secular, not religious. EEOC v. 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 597 F.3d 769, 
778 (6th Cir. 2010). Several circuit courts had adopted the “primary duties” 
test as the best method for determining ministerial status. See Alcazar v. 
Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 
(9th Cir. 2010) (identifying circuit court tests for the ministerial exception).  
In the Sixth Circuit, an employee was considered a minister if her “primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious 
ritual and worship.” Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778. The Sixth Circuit 
viewed Perich’s duties as primarily secular because she taught the same 
classes as lay teachers and spent minimal time (only 45 minutes) during the 
school day on religious activity. Id. at 779-80.  
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the primary duties test, identifying 
three flaws in the circuit court’s reasoning. First, the circuit court ignored 
Perich’s status as a “called” teacher who had taken special theological 
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courses in order to attain commissioned status; the Supreme Court 
concluded that her title and training mattered. Second, the circuit court was 
wrong to conclude that the fact that Perich and the lay teachers at the school 
performed the same duties affected Perich’s ministerial status. Third, the 
circuit court erred in emphasizing that religious duties consumed only 45 
minutes of Perich’s workday; the Court found that the amount of time was 
not dispositive. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708. The Court also rejected 
the idea that the ministerial exception should apply only to employees who 
perform exclusively religious functions, expressing doubt that any 
exclusively religious employee actually exists. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 
708-709. 
In rejecting the primary duties test, the Court concluded that 
ministerial status “cannot be resolved by a stopwatch.” Id. at 709. Instead, 
the Court summarized the four issues relevant to Perich’s ministerial status: 
“the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that 
title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she 
performed for the Church.” Id. at 708.  
About those four issues, the Court was detailed in its inclusion of the 
facts of Perich’s case. Perich had the official title, “Minister of Religion, 
Commissioned,” spelled out on her “diploma of vocation,” and was 
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reviewed by her congregation for her “skills of ministry,” “ministerial 
responsibilities,” and “continuing education as a professional person in the 
ministry of the Gospel.” Id. at 707. Perich also had significant religious 
training (eight college-level courses and oral examinations) as well as an 
official commissioning (requiring endorsement by the local synod, letters of 
recommendation, a personal statement, written answers to ministry-related 
questions, and election by a congregation). Id.  
The Court noted that “Perich held herself out as a minister of the 
Church,” not only by accepting the church’s call to service and describing 
herself as a minister at Hosanna-Tabor, but also by claiming a housing 
allowance on her tax return that was available only to members of the 
ministry. Id. at 707-708.  
Finally, “Perich's job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church's 
message and carrying out its mission. … As a source of religious instruction, 
Perich performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the 
next generation.” Id. at 708. Despite its criticism of the Sixth Circuit for 
counting the activities in Perich’s day, the Court itemized Perich’s 
responsibilities in the school, where she taught religion four days a week, led 
students in prayer three times a day, took her students to chapel once a week 
and led the services two times a year. Id.  
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Although the Court declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding 
when an employee qualifies as a minister,” the Court found it had evidence 
“enough … to conclude” that Perich was a minister on the facts of her 
specific case. Id. at 707. The clearest factors influencing the Court were “the 
formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, 
her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed 
for the Church.” Id. at 708.   
II. This Court identified a different three-part test for identifying a 
minister in Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 
As noted above, Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor 
confirmed this Court’s holding in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) that “formal ordination 
[is] not necessary for the ‘ministerial’ exception to apply.” Hosanna-Tabor, 
132 S. Ct. at 714 (Alito, J., concurring). In Southwestern Baptist, this Court 
upheld the district court’s ruling that the Seminary’s faculty were ministers 
because the Seminary “ma[de] employment decisions regarding faculty 
members largely on religious criteria.” Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 
283. The faculty, moreover, were “intermediaries between the Convention 
and the future ministers of many local Baptist churches” and instructed the 
seminarians in religious doctrine. Id.  
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In contrast, the Seminary’s support staff—even those who were 
ordained or studying for ordination—were not ministers because they were 
“not engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or 
religious.” Id. at 284. The opinion acknowledged that under its standard 
some Seminary administrators would qualify as ministers but that others 
(specifically those involved in finance, maintenance and non-academic 
matters) would not. Id. at 285.  
This Court relied upon Southwestern Baptist’s analysis when it 
addressed the ministerial status of a Choir Director in Starkman v. Evans, 
198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999). Starkman identified the following three-factor 
test for determining ministerial status: 
First, this court must consider whether employment decisions 
regarding the position at issue are made “largely on religious criteria” 
[citation omitted] … Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of 
the “ministerial exception,” the court must consider whether the 
plaintiff was qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of 
the Church … [citation omitted]; Third, and probably most important, 
is whether Ms. Starkman “engaged in activities traditionally 
considered ecclesiastical or religious,” [citation omitted] including 
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whether the plaintiff “attends to the religious needs of the faithful.” Id. 
at 176.  
Following Southwestern Baptist, the third factor received the most emphasis 
as this Court observed that it was “sufficient that Ms. Starkman clearly 
performed tasks that were ‘traditionally ecclesiastical or religious.’”  Id. at 
177 (emphasis added).  
There are similarities between the last factor identified by the 
Supreme Court (the “important religious functions performed for the 
Church”) and the third Starkman factor (“activities traditionally considered 
ecclesiastical or religious”). Hosanna-Tabor, however, unlike Starkman, did 
not hold that it is sufficient that the tasks performed were traditionally 
ecclesiastical or religious. Instead, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court looked also 
to the details of the position that conferred the legal ministerial designation. 
The elements in Hosanna-Tabor—a formal title, the substance of the title, 
the use of the title—are significant issues that may escape consideration in 
the Starkman test. This point is confirmed by the Court’s criticism of the 
Sixth Circuit for failing to take into account Perich’s status as a called 
teacher who had taken special theological courses and then been 
commissioned to her role when it applied the primary duties test. Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.  A review of the district court’s opinion in this case 
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confirms that Hosanna-Tabor mandates a different analysis from that 
conducted under the Starkman factors.  
III. The Starkman test, used by the district court to determine 
whether Cannata was a minister, does not address all the issues 
identified by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor.  
 
The status of an employee as a minister is a legal conclusion subject 
to plenary review. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283; see also Starkman, 
198 F.3d at 176 (the “status of employees as ministers . . . remains a legal 
conclusion for this court.”). The district court concluded that Cannata was 
not a minister under prong one of the Starkman test but was a minister under 
prongs two and three. Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, No. A-10-CA-
375 LY, 2011 WL 4352771, at *7-*12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2011). The 
district court’s determination of facts must be accepted unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283.  
Starkman’s prong one, whether the hiring decision was made “largely 
on religious criteria,” 198 F.3d at 176, does not match any of the four 
considerations identified by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor. Prong two, 
“whether the plaintiff was qualified and authorized to perform the 
ceremonies of the Church,” and prong three, whether the employee 
“engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious,” id. 
at 176, are similar to the Court’s consideration of the “important religious 
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functions … performed for the Church” in Hosanna-Tabor. 132 S. Ct. at 
708.  
The district court’s reliance on prongs two and three of Starkman runs 
counter to the Court’s clear finding that other facts might be significant to 
determining ministerial status. Cannata, 2011 WL 4352771 at *9-*12. Facts 
from Cannata’s case that might lead to a different result under Hosanna-
Tabor’s standard than under the Starkman test are that Cannata held the title 
of Music Director, id. at *2, not Minister; that he was not hired according to 
religious criteria, id. at *7, *8; that he had no training or commissioning 
similar to those that weighed against the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, id. at 
*8; that his hiring and job responsibilities were exactly the same as prior 
Music Directors who were not Catholic, id. at *8; and that there is no 
reference to whether Cannata claims tax status as a minister.  
Furthermore, in contrast to Perich, who had been through a 
commissioning ceremony and claimed tax status as a minister, the only 
evidence that Cannata held himself out as a minister was his statement that 
by his labor he was “helping to unfold the Creator’s work and contributing, 
by our personal industry, to the realization in history of the divine plan.” Id. 
at *12; see also Appellees’ Brief at 19. Although some denominations may 
view every member as a minister, Hosanna-Tabor does not hold that 
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unordained employees who make statements of personal spirituality are 
holding themselves out as ministers.  
Both parties argue that Justice Alito’s concurrence supports their 
position. See Appellant’s Brief at 14; Appellees’ Brief at 24; Appellant’s 
Reply Brief at 2. The Alito concurrence, joined only by Justice Kagan, 
places its “focus on the function performed by persons who work for 
religious bodies.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711. According to the 
concurrence, the ministerial exception “should apply to any ‘employee’ who 
leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important 
religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its 
faith.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712; see also id. (Ministers “include 
those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important 
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious ceremonies 
and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying the 
tenets of the faith to the next generation.”). The language of the concurrence 
is more similar to Starkman than to the Opinion of the Court, and it is 
possible that it would lead to the same result as Starkman. However, the 
concurrence would also lead the Court to make some additional inquiries, 
including, e.g., whether a Music Director “conducts worship services.” Id. 
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In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court rejected the type of bright-line 
test embodied in Starkman in favor of a fact-intensive inquiry that looks at 
many aspects of both how the religious institution regarded the plaintiff and 
how the plaintiff conducted herself. As a result, the district court’s decision 
would probably need to be reevaluated under the Hosanna-Tabor standard.  
 
        Respectfully Submitted, 
 
        Leslie C. Griffin 
        Professor  
        University of Houston 
     100 Law Center 
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NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING 
  
 The undersigned, LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ., hereby certifies that on 
May 23, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing Amicus Curiae’s Post-
Trial Brief with the Clerk of Court in accordance with the Electronic Case 
Files System of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 /s/   Leslie C. Griffin   
 LESLIE C. GRIFFIN 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
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Philip E. Cannata 
9406 Scenic Bluff Drive 
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Steven C. Levatino 
Andrew F. MacRae 
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 Professor of Law  
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